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event she should desire to make a new will she must destroy "both copies of the
will in her possession and he would 'definitely destroy the copy' which he
retained.''1 Thereafter, testatrix destroyed one of the two copies retained by
her and struck out an objectionable devise in the other copy. Testatrix made
no attempt to alter or destroy the third copy, although she was in temporary
possession of it at a later date. The legatee (plaintiff) was successful in setting
aside the decree of final settlement of the decedent's estate according to the laws
of intestacy, and he secured an order that the altered copy of the will be probated. The administratrix (defendant) appealed, alleging the court erred in not
finding a revocation. Held, affirmed. Roberts v. Fisher, (Ind. App. 1951) 98
N.E. (2d) 215, rehearing denied 98 N.E. (2d) 918.
The chief point of interest in the principal case is the handling by the court
of the common law presumption of a testator'~ intent to revoke when an executed copy of a will in his possession is destroyed or missing.2 This presumption
is applied even when an executed copy of the will is produced by its custodian.3
The court in the principal case refuses to apply the presumption where the
testator has lost or acted upon only one of several duly executed copies retained
by him. It leaves the question of intention to revoke entirely to the jury.4 There
is authority in support of this position,5 one case even going so far as to reverse
the common law presumption under these circumstances.6 Many leading text
writers, however, would prefer that the presumption be "weakened," rather than
abolished. 7 Some courts have "weakened" or refused to apply the presumption
in cases where the testator: (a) later came into possession of the duplicate without destroying it;8 (b) showed a "continuing fondness" for the sole legatee;9
(c) indicated satisfaction with the remaining copy.10 Still, the presumption
stands, and in many cases it controls the result.11 It is apparent that any such
presumption does, in effect, rewrite the usual statute of wills, which requires
1 Principal case at 217. Counsel likewise advised testatrix against interlineations, indicating that they would be ineffective.
2 2 PAGB, WrLLS, 3d ed., 720 (1941); Stevens v. Hope, 52 Mich. 65, 17 N.W. 698
(1883); In re Kennedy, 167 N.Y. 163, 60 N.E. 442 (1901).
3 1 PAGB, WILLS, 3d ed., 788 ff. (1941); 1 JARMAN, WILLS, 7th ed., 139 ff. (1930);
48 A.L.R. 297 (1927); In re Field, 109 Misc. 409, 178 N.Y.S. 778 (1919); McDonald v.
McDonald, 142 Ind. 55, 41 N.E. 336 (1895). _
4 Principal case at 218.
5 Doe ex. dem Strickland v. Strickland, 8 C.B. 724, 137 Eng. Rep. 693 (1849).
6 Roberts v. Round, 3 Hagg. Eccl. 548, 162 Eng. Rep. 1258 at 1260 (1830).
71 WoBRNBR, AM. LAw OF ADM. 131 (1923); 2 GRBENLBAF, EvmBNCB, 16th ed.
626 (1899); 1 JARMAN, WILLS, 7th ed., 138 ff. (1930) and cases cited.
s In re Walsh, 196 Mich. 42, 163 N.W. 70 (1917).
9 Managle v. Parker, 75 N.H. 139, 71 A. 637 (1908).
10 Ibid; also Onions v. Tyrer, 2 Vern. 741, 24 Eng. Rep. 418 (1716).
11 Bates' Estate, 286 Pa. 583, 134 A. 513 (1926); Jones v. Harding, 58 L.T. (N.S.)
60, 52 J.P. 71 (1887); Matter of Schofield, 72 Misc. 281, 128 N.Y.S. 190 (1911). In a
recent case concerning duplicate wills the court classified the presumption as "strong,"
requiring more than ordinary proof to rebut, holding that "clear and satisfactory" evidence
was necessary for this purpose. In re Drake's Estate, 150 Neb. 568, 35 N.W. (2d) 417
(1948).
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that animo revocandi be proved without the benefit of presumption when the
will is destroyed12 and which allows lost wills to be probated.13 In the case of
duplicate wills a strong attack may be made against the application of a presumption of intent to revoke. The primary purpose of the duplicate copy is to
secure the will against loss or destruction, either accidentally or by interested
relatives. To apply a presumption of complete revocation when a copy retained
by the testator is missing would nullify the purpose of the duplicate. As courts
are also inclined to take an attitude of suspicion when only the custodian's copy
of two duly executed instruments is missing,14 the chance for difficulty in probating a duplicate will is again increased. It has, therefore, been suggested that
an unexecuted copy of the will would better serve the testator's purpose.15
Clearly the testator should deposit the executed copy with an impartial, readily
available custodian, and retain the unexecuted copy himself. The latter copy
would then serve the dual purpose of refreshing the testator's memory during
his life and aiding the proof of the will's contents on his death. So long as the
presumption of intention to revoke remains, it is unwise for the testator to retain
an executed copy of his will, and the "precaution" of a duplicate will is illusory.

Richard F. Hooker
12 57 AM_. ]UR. 343 ff. (1948).
1s Id. at 433 ff.
14 In re Robinson's Will, 257 App. Div. 405, 13 N.Y.S. 324 (1939); Crossman v.
Crossman, 95 N.Y. 145 (1884). The former case is doubtful authority for the proposition
that both copies of the will must be presented or else probate denied. The court cited
dictum in the Crossman case (at page 152) to the effect that it would be "proper" for the
judge to require both copies of identical instruments as a precaution in proving contents
and to insure that the other copy was not revoked.
151949 Umv. Ir.r.. L.F. (Spring) 177 at 179.

